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CHINESE PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW: CAN 
CHINA BUILD ANOTHER GREAT WALL TO 
PROTECT ITS CONSUMERS? 
GARY ZHAO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) recently amended, enacted, and 
repealed a large number of laws in an effort to improve its image and 
standing in the eyes of the international community. These new laws have 
introduced features to stabilize China’s legal system. However, these features 
have not become uniform and comprehensively applicable rules that address 
people’s needs and values. Along with providing benefits and protection, 
these new laws also contain serious flaws and impose heavy social costs.1 
Vague statutory construction and ineffective enforcement have caused these 
statutory defects.  
This Note will examine Chinese product liability law, an area of law that 
largely has been overlooked by foreign companies and legal scholars. The 
Product Quality Law2 and the Consumer Protection Law3 are the two main 
components of Chinese product liability legal reform. Although promulgated 
in 1993 and implemented in 1994, both domestic and foreign consumers and 
manufacturers still ignore these two statutes. This Note is divided into six 
parts. Part II examines the origin and background of Chinese product liability 
law. Parts III and IV focus on statutory construction and enforcement 
mechanisms present in current Chinese product liability statutes. Part V 
discusses recent improvements. Part VI suggests measures for reform. 
  J.D. 2002, Washington University School of Law; B.A. 1999, University of Michigan. The 
author would like to thank Professor Francis Foster of the School of Law for her kind guidance and 
encouragement. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable editing assistance of the entire 
Global Studies Law Review staff, whose hours of hard work and insightful comments greatly 
improved this Note. The author also wishes to thank his parents and Rita for their generous and 
unconditional support of his education and growth. 
 1. See RONALD C. KEITH & ZHIQIU LIN, LAW AND JUSTICE IN CHINA’S NEW MARKETPLACE 3 
(2001) (discussing the social effects of the PRC’s legal transition). 
 2. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chanpin Zhiliang Fa [Product Quality Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (1993) (amended 2000) [hereinafter Product Quality Law]. 
 3. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa [Law of the People’s Republic 
of China On the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Consumers] (1993) [hereinafter Consumer 
Protection Law]. 
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II. PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW IN CHINA FROM 1949 TO 1993 
In the early days of the PRC, centralized product liability laws did not 
exist.4 Producers and sellers of defective products were held liable according 
to their contractual relationship with the victim or consumer. If no such 
contractual relationship existed, injured parties relied on a complex system of 
rights and obligations to receive compensation.5 Most of these principles 
were embodied in the General Provisions of the Civil Law, which was 
enacted in 1986.6 
Article 122 of the Chinese Civil Law defines a “defective” product as a 
product of “substandard quality.”7 This legal construction has forced Chinese 
courts to rely upon “administrative and technical specifications rather than by 
the general criterion of safety.”8 In the early days of the PRC, these “quality 
requirements” were either too broad or nonexistent.9 Due to China’s complex 
and disorderly bureaucratic machinery,10 Chinese courts encountered 
confusion regarding the interpretation and enforcement of these 
requirements. 
Under the Civil Law, to recover for damage caused by a defective 
product, that damage must have been caused “by the violation of an 
enumerated right.”11 Recovery was not limited to personal and property 
damages.12 Theoretically, pure economic losses such as lost profits also were 
recoverable.13 
Prior to 1993, consumers also sought relief in product liability cases under 
China’s Code of Criminal Procedure,14 which stated that victims who 
 4. See Edward J. Epstein, Tortious Liability for Defective Products in the People’s Republic of 
China, 2 J. CHINESE L. 285 (1988). 
 5. Id. at 294. 
 6. General Provisions of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (1987), translated in 
DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 199 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994) [hereinafter Civil 
Law]. 
 7. Id. at 217. 
 8. Epstein, supra note 4, at 302-03. 
 9. Id. at 304. 
 10. “Formal legal institutions are neither functionally well-differentiated from other institutions 
wielding state power nor permitted to operate with a high degree of regularity. Law and policy remain 
linked, and legality is necessarily weak.” BASIC CONCEPTS OF CHINESE LAW 17 (Tahirih V. Lee ed., 
1997).  See also Stanley Lubman, Methodological Problems in Studying Chinese Communist “Civil 
Law”, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 243 (Jerome 
Alan Cohen ed., 1970) (stating that the lack of differentiation of Chinese legal from other 
administrative activities is especially evident in the criminal process). 
 11. Epstein, supra note 4, at 300. 
 12. Id. at 296. 
 13. See id. at 297-98. 
 14. Id. at 316. 
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suffered “material losses as a result of the defendant’s criminal act” could file 
a civil action.15 Thus, distribution of a substandard product not only could 
bring criminal penalties for the violating party, but it also enabled the injured 
party to file a civil claim for compensation.16 
Various local laws aimed at protecting consumer rights also emerged.17 
The Fujian Province introduced one of China’s first consumer protection 
laws.18 Promulgation of local legislation also promoted the growth of many 
local consumer associations.19 The Chinese Consumer Association (CCA), 
the only national consumer rights protection agency, emerged during this 
period.20 
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 
A. Statutory Construction 
Currently, there continues to be no unified code on product liability in 
China. However, the Consumer Protection Law and the Product Quality Law 
operate together to protect Chinese consumers. The Consumer Protection 
Law, promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) in October 1993, became effective in early 1994. This law 
created rights for consumers21 as well as positive duties for “business 
operators.”22 Unfortunately, some of the law’s language and its main 
enforcement mechanisms lack effectiveness.  
The earlier Civil Law’s contractual liability for defective products is 
evident in the modern Consumer Protection Law. Article 16 states that 
“[w]here an agreement exists between a consumer and a business operator, 
obligations shall be carried out in accordance with that agreement. An 
agreement between the parties concerned shall not, however, be in 
contravention of laws and regulations.”23 This contractual liability is listed 
first among nine other positive duties imposed on the business operators,24 
 15. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] art. 53 (1979). 
 16. Epstein, supra note 4, at 316. 
 17. Id. at 292-93. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Role for Nongovernmental Organizations, 25 YALE 
J. INTL L. 363, 414 (2000). 
 21. See Consumer Protection Law arts. 7-15. 
 22. See id. arts. 16-25. 
 23. Id. art. 16. 
 24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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suggesting that contractual liability is the paramount duty binding business 
operators.  
Some Chinese legal scholars interpret consumer rights and business 
operators’ fair dealing obligations in this law as recommendations for 
contracting parties with less negotiating power.25 This contention is 
supported by the language of the Consumer Protection Law. For example, 
Article 4 requires that business operators conduct their transactions with 
consumers “according to the principles of voluntary participation, equality, 
fairness, honesty and trustworthiness.”26 Article 24 adds: “A business 
operator shall not be permitted to set unreasonable or unfair terms for 
consumers or alleviate or release itself from civil liability for harming the 
legal rights and interests of consumers by means of standard contracts, 
circulars, announcements, shop notices, etc.”27 Thus, Chinese lawmakers 
have maintained a system whereby product liability is created through 
consumers’ contractual obligations with manufacturers or sellers.  
The Consumer Protection Law also has several structural flaws. Much of 
the law’s inability to realize its potential lies in its inadequate construction. 
For example, Article 18 of the Consumer Protection Law creates a positive 
duty for business operators to ensure consumer safety and economic 
interests.28 However, the law does not define the words “business operator” 
or “consumer.”29 This raises a question of coverage. It is unclear whether the 
rights sections extend to injured parties other than the direct consumer.  
The second paragraph of Article 35 vaguely mentions legal protection for 
any “other injured party whose person or property is harmed due to a 
commodity defect.”30 Thus, the Consumer Protection Law appears to extend 
to third parties. However, no section of the Consumer Protection Law 
specifically states whether sellers or producers have a duty of care or 
protection for the parties that their products might affect.31 The consumer 
rights and business operators’ duties sections provide protection only for 
“consumers” or “a consumer.”32 As a result, the addition of the words “other 
injured party”33 simply does not harmonize with rest of the statute.  
The language of Article 35 also states that the “other injured party” may 
 25. See QING KAI SHI & WEN HUA LIU, DIRECTORY OF LIABILITIES IN CHINA 169-95 (1999). 
 26. Consumer Protection Law art. 4.  
 27. Id. art. 24. 
 28. Id. art. 18. 
 29. Donald Paragon, Product Liability in the PRC, CHINA L. & PRAC., Sept. 1999, at 29. 
 30. Consumer Protection Law art. 35. 
 31. See id. arts. 1-34. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. art. 35. 
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“demand compensation from the seller or may also demand compensation 
from the producer.”34 Here, Article 35 introduces the terms “seller” and 
“producer.”35 However, the law does not specify whether these terms can be 
used interchangeably with “business operator.”36 Moreover, the term 
“business operator,”37 which never is defined clearly, only compounds the 
confusion.  
Under the Consumer Protection Law, liability does not automatically 
attach when enumerated rights and obligations are violated. The text is silent 
after proclaiming a right or obligation. Often, it is not clear what will result if 
a business operator breaches his obligation under the law.38 Instead, Chapter 
VII creates a new set of liabilities.39 However, several articles on rights and 
obligations are mutually exclusive of these Chapter VII legal liabilities.40 
This flaw jeopardizes the law’s effectiveness. When violations of enumerated 
rights and obligations under the law do not create liability, the provisions 
lack legal effect.  
Currently, no provision of the Consumer Protection Law is subject to 
more controversy than Article 18.41 This Article provides that a business 
operator shall (1) meet requirements for safety, and (2) provide clear 
warnings and prevention against safety hazards.42 However, this Article does 
not provide liability for violations of the enumerated duties. The civil 
liabilities chapter of the Consumer Protection Law also is silent with regard 
to liability.43 No language in the text indicates that liability should be 
attached to business operators’ failure to provide clear warnings and 
corrective procedures for possible defects in their products.44  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. For example, Article 15 stipulates: 
A consumer shall have the right to supervise the protection of consumers’ rights and interests in 
work related to commodities and services.  
A consumer shall have the right to report or complain of acts infringing upon the rights and 
interests of consumers, and unlawful or derelict acts of State authorities and personnel in the 
course of protecting the rights and interests of consumers. A consumer shall have the right to 
criticize and make suggestions for the protection of the rights and interests of consumers. 
Id. art 15. Although many of the enumerated consumer rights have corresponding liabilities under 
Chapter VII, this Chapter did not establish liability for violations of a consumer’s right to report 
unlawful acts of State authorities. The Consumer Protection Law text simply is silent on the subject. 
 39. Id. ch. VII. 
 40. Id.  
 41. See id. art. 18. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. ch. VII. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p581 Zhao book pages .doc  10/15/02   4:11 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
586   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:581 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, a business operator bears civil liability when “a defect exists in 
a commodity.”45 However, the statute does not clarify possible defects.  
B. Enforcement  
The Consumer Protection Law advocates two approaches to enforcement. 
In Article 5, the Chinese Government retains the power and duty to protect 
consumers.46 The Article states: “The State shall adopt measures to protect 
consumers in the legal exercise of their rights and shall safeguard consumers’ 
legal rights and interests.”47 However, the Consumer Protection Law does 
not contain any provision regarding the way the government will carry out 
the promised protection. Under Article 26, the government is only obligated 
to “listen to and take into account the views and requirements of 
consumers.”48 Article 34 provides that consumers may resolve disputes with 
business operators over their rights and interests in the following ways: (1) 
negotiate a settlement with the business operator; (2) request a consumer 
association to mediate; (3) complain to the relevant administrative 
department; (4) apply to an arbitral body for arbitration in accordance with 
the arbitration agreement reached with the business operator; or (5) institute 
legal proceedings in a People’s Court.49 Again, the state is not involved in the 
enforcement of consumer rights. In practice, there is no state-run consumer 
rights protection agency. The government only prescribes penalties against 
sellers or manufacturers when criminal laws are violated.50 This lack of 
enforcement mechanisms seriously hinders the effectiveness of the statute.  
Realizing the enormous responsibility of protecting all Chinese consumer 
rights, the government turned to the consumers for help. Article 6 of the 
Consumer Protection Law introduces the second approach to enforcement: 
“[t]he whole society shall bear responsibility for the protection of consumers’ 
legal rights and interests.”51  
The CCA exemplifies this approach. Although not specifically mentioned 
in the text, the CCA has become the primary independent enforcement body 
under the Consumer Protection Law.52 The CCA was founded by the State 
Council in 1984, nearly a decade before the enactment of the Consumer 
 45. Id. art. 40(1). 
 46. Id. art. 5. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. art. 26. 
 49. Id. art. 34. 
 50. Id. art. 29. 
 51. Id. art. 6. 
 52. See Lee, supra note 20, at 414. 
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Protection Law, in response to a joint proposal by three central governmental 
agencies.53 However, the CCA remains independent of governmental 
organs.54 The Consumer Protection Law acknowledges the importance of the 
CCA and other local consumer associations already in existence.55 As a 
result, the Consumer Protection Law dedicates an independent chapter to 
“consumer organizations.”56  
Article 31 states that the main objectives of CCA and like organizations 
are “to carry out social supervision of commodities and services and protect 
the legal rights and interests of consumers.”57 The CCA engages in four 
categories of activities: (1) research on consumer issues; (2) dissemination of 
knowledge to the public; (3) mediation of consumer disputes; and (4) advice 
to the government on consumer related issues.58 The CCA functions as an 
accessory to the Consumer Protection Law separate from the government 
apparatus.59 Thus, the CCA lacks the effective disciplinary and regulatory 
authority held by official state organs.60 When the CCA discovers a serious 
violation of consumer rights, its only recourse is to refer the discovery to 
appropriate government administrative agencies.61 According to Article 32, 
Section 3, a consumer rights organization may “report to, inquire of, or make 
suggestions to relevant administrative departments on issues concerning the 
legal rights and interests of consumers.”62 Additionally, the CCA does not 
possess the power to directly pass new regulations related to consumer 
protection.63  
One of the CCA’s most important duties is to educate consumers about 
their rights,64 and the CCA has accomplished a great deal since its inception. 
Since 1996, the CCA has “received over three million complaints and 
successfully settled approximately ninety-seven percent of them.”65 In 2000 
alone, “178,849 [complaints] were solved, and the rate of solution reached 
96.9 percent, in which 94.55 million yuan (US$11.39 million) of consumers’ 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Consumer Protection Law ch. V. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. art. 31. 
 58. Lee, supra note 20, at 415. 
 59. Id. at 417. 
 60. Id. at 418. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Consumer Protection Law art. 32(3). 
 63. Lee, supra note 20, at 418 (stating “[t]he feature most frequently raised . . . to distinguish the 
organization from its state counterpart was the lack of formal regulatory authority over the subject 
matter to which they were assigned.”). 
 64. Id. at 416. 
 65. Id. 
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losses were recovered.”66 Despite the organization’s ability to resolve a large 
number of complaints and its commitment to improvement, there are still 
serious complaints about the CCA from consumers. 
Chinese consumers can be divided into two categories: rural and urban. 
Urban consumers make up a large portion of the Chinese consumer market, 
totaling more than two hundred million people.67 A 1997 survey conducted 
jointly by the State Statistics Bureau, People’s Bank of China, All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, and ministries of Labor, Public Health, and 
Civil Affairs demonstrated that urban consumers are not particularly satisfied 
with the CCA’s performance.68 The results of the survey disclosed that one 
fourth of all urban consumers reported infringements of their rights resulting 
in a combined economic loss of 6.8 billion yuan (US$819 million).69 The 
survey also found that only 22% of victimized urban consumers actually 
expressed their concerns.70 Of the 22% who complained, only 1.1% resorted 
to legal action.71 However, the survey did not disclose the percentage of 
consumers who utilized consumer associations to hold manufacturers or 
sellers liable.72 This vast majority of silent victims leads to a simple 
conclusion: limitations on the CCA’s regulatory and disciplinary authority 
cost consumers, and the Chinese government has not provided additional 
resources or means to enforce the Consumer Protection Law.  
A national survey conducted by the CCA among rural consumers reached 
similar discouraging conclusions.73 From January to February 1996, the CCA 
interviewed fifty-five hundred rural consumers across China.74 Of those 
interviewed, 66% reported infringements of their rights as consumers.75 
Based on these alarming results, the CCA realized that “immediate and great 
efforts are needed to improve the rural consumption environment . . .”76 A 
subsequent investigation found that most dissatisfied consumers had 
purchased defective and inferior products from small business shops where 
counterfeit or substandard products are more common.77  
 66. Jia Hepeng, Association Answers Complaints, CHINA DAILY, July 15, 2000. 
 67. China Sets Up Legal Framework to Protect Consumers, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Mar. 
14, 1997. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Rural Consumers of China Complain Fraud Commodities, XINHUA, Mar. 12, 1998, available 
at 1998 WL 4800012. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 
 77. Id. “More than 71 percent of the rural residents involved said they suffered losses from 
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Almost half of the rural consumers surveyed did not know that the four-
year-old Consumer Protection Law even existed.78 Of those consumers who 
were familiar with the Law, many did not know where to turn for help.79 As 
for those consumers who actually located the appropriate agency with which 
to file their complaint, many doubted that their complaints would be settled 
successfully.80 During their interviews, many rural consumers complained 
that top business managers knew about the Consumer Protection Law but 
chose not to follow it.81 In addition, rural consumers felt that penalties 
prescribed by the national government for violating the Consumer Protection 
Law were too insignificant for manufacturers or sellers to take notice.82 
As previously mentioned, the CCA is not an official government 
organization and it lacks disciplinary and legislative powers.83 The 
insufficient government support contributes to the CCA’s inability to address 
consumer complaints.84 When the CCA was created, “many of the CCA’s 
top-level personnel [were] former government officials, particularly from the 
National Bureau of Industry and Commerce . . . and the National Bureau of 
Standards . . . both of which have regulatory authority over some consumer 
affairs and both of which were instrumental in the formation of the CCA.”85 
Over the years, the CCA’s increased independence has caused a significant 
reduction in the supply of manpower from the government.86 The Consumer 
Protection Law vaguely provides for some governmental assistance.87 Article 
32 concludes: “People’s Governments at all levels shall support the consumer 
associations in the implementation of their duties and functions.”88 However, 
subsequent language provides no concrete details about the level of support 
to be provided.89 There is no indication of the types of future government 
support. 
The Consumer Protection Law provides limited resources to the CCA and 
other consumer rights organizations to protect consumers. The Law “charges 
buying daily commodities with quality problems, and 35 percent of those surveyed reported losses 
while buying substandard farming materials.” Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Lee, supra note 20, at 418. 
 84. See id. at 415-17. 
 85. Id. at 415. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Consumer Protection Law art. 32. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
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the CCA with supporting consumer-initiated lawsuits against violators.”90 
Legal assistance is the sixth of the seven listed remedial functions of the 
CCA,91 and the CCA is still unclear about “how extensive a role it should 
play in this regard.”92 This is the result of yet another statutory ambiguity—
the text “does not define what the CCA’s duty to support consumer-initiated 
litigation actually entails.”93 
Without real and effective government support, consumer associations are 
not effective vehicles for consumer protection. The text of the Consumer 
Protection Law indicates that the Chinese government wants consumers to 
rely on these associations as the primary means to resolve their concerns. 
Article 31 states that consumer associations shall be “established in 
accordance with the laws that carry out social supervision of commodities 
and services and protect the legal rights and interests of consumers.”94 
Therein lies the problem. The CCA desperately needs state delegation of 
regulatory and disciplinary powers. While the government wants the CCA to 
act as its official enforcer, it is either unwilling or unable to provide the 
support the CCA needs. A Chinese government that is unwilling to spend the 
energy and resources to enforce its own laws hinders the CCA’s ability to 
assist consumers.  
C. The Toshiba Case  
The ongoing Toshiba case95 reveals serious flaws in statutory construction 
and enforcement mechanisms under the Consumer Protection Law. Toshiba, 
the Japanese electronics giant, refused to compensate Chinese consumers for 
possible glitches in its laptop computers, while at the same time agreeing to 
pay up to US$1.05 billion to its users in the United States.96 Toshiba ignited a 
legal controversy by failing to publish a Chinese language notice to its users 
concerning the possible glitches.97 
The first issue raised by the Toshiba case concerns compensation for 
potential damages.98 Toshiba asserted that Chinese consumers were denied 
compensation because “China does not have concrete laws concerning this 
 90. Lee, supra note 20, at 417. 
 91. Consumer Protection Law art. 32. 
 92. Lee, supra note 20, at 417. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Consumer Protection Law art. 31. 
 95. See Jin Zeqing, Toshiba knows little of China’s laws, CHINA DAILY, June 1, 2000. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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kind of compensation as does the United States.”99 The CCA responded, 
claiming that “China’s Law on the Protection of Consumers’ Rights, 
Contract Law and Product Quality Law all stipulate that manufacturers are 
obliged to tell the truth and compensate consumers whenever at-large 
problems loom.”100 The CCA further asserted that “[t]he right to know the 
truth is a basic consumer right” and a violation of this right creates civil 
liability.101 Toshiba’s strongest defense stems from the lack of concrete 
language attaching liability to the “right to know” section of the Consumer 
Protection Law.102  
A more troublesome issue in the Toshiba case revolves around the 
Consumer Protection Law’s definition of “defect” and whether potential 
defects fall within the general definition.103 Toshiba charged that the 
Consumer Protection Law lacks a definition for “defect,” and that the alleged 
glitch in their computer program constitutes a potential defect.104 More 
importantly, Toshiba argued that a business operator’s duty does not extend 
beyond foreseeability.105 Thus, if the possible glitch was not foreseeable, then 
Toshiba is not bound under Article 18’s disclosure requirement.106 Toshiba’s 
defense found support within the Chinese legal community.107 Several 
Chinese legal scholars also have criticized the construction of the Consumer 
Protection Law as providing a loophole for Toshiba.108 Wu Jingming, 
assistant professor of the Chinese University of Political Science and Law, 
was quoted as saying that “the law was ‘general and rough’ under which 
Chinese Toshiba customers could hardly claim compensation from the 
company.”109 
The Toshiba case also challenges the strength of the enforcement means 
provided by the Consumer Protection Law. Article 29 requires relevant state 
authorities to “penalize, in accordance with laws and statutory regulations, 
business operators for illegal and criminal acts that infringe upon the legal 
rights and interests of consumers during the provision of commodities and 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Consumer Protection Law art. 40(1). 
 104. Jin Zeqing, supra note 95. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Consumer Protection Law art. 18. 
 107. See Jin Zeqing, supra note 95. 
 108. Meng Yan, Toshiba Case Triggers Debate Over Consumer Law, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 29, 
1999. 
 109. Id. 
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services.”110 However, the law does not specify the “relevant State 
authorities.”111 So far, no Chinese government agency has taken the initiative 
under Article 29 to “punish” Toshiba, and the government did not even 
protest Toshiba’s actions until the Chinese media publicized the case.112 
Many legal scholars have blamed the Toshiba controversy on inadequate 
enforcement and implementation by the local government.113 As Wu 
Hongwei, an assistant professor at Renmin University of China said “better 
implementation of the consumer protection law needs more involvement of 
local legislators.”114 
In the absence of government enforcement, some citizens are turning to 
private suits. Three Chinese consumers have filed a lawsuit against Toshiba 
in a Beijing court, seeking at least 80,000 yuan (US$9,660) in compensation 
for the company’s alleged failure to inform owners about flaws in some of its 
notebook computers and provide a remedy.115 In addition, over one hundred 
consumers from Northeast China “have organized a class-action lawsuit to 
seek compensation from the Japanese company.”116 
The CCA has experienced difficulties in teaching consumers their rights. 
However, consumer awareness is not the cause of product defects. The 
manufacturers and sellers themselves are the source of the defects. The 
Toshiba case raises other challenges for the CCA: Is the CCA accountable 
for educating manufacturers about their obligations under the Consumer 
Protection Law? If not, what organization or government agency carries this 
burden? The Product Quality Law, enacted in conjunction with the 
Consumer Protection Law, addresses some of these issues. 
IV. PRODUCT QUALITY LAW 
A. Statutory Construction 
The Product Quality Law, enacted in 1993, is a significant improvement 
over the Consumer Protection Law. It is intended to reinforce the 
“supervision and regulation of product quality” and clarify “the liabilities for 
product quality.”117 The text of the law explicitly provides that supervision 
 110. Consumer Protection Law art. 29. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Meng Yan, supra note 108. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Jin Zeqing, supra note 95. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Product Quality Law art. 1. 
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and control are its two main enforcement components.118 While the Product 
Quality Law offers comprehensive coverage for consumers, there are fewer 
references to the word “consumer.”119 Instead, Article 41 reflects a legislative 
intent of broad coverage by holding producers responsible for “damages 
done to the person or property except the defective products themselves 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘property of others’) due to the defects of 
products.”120 This focus on the end user surpasses the contractual privity 
hurdle encountered in previous product liability laws and mitigates the 
confusion created by the vague term “consumer” in the Consumer Protection 
Law.121 
Despite the progress and improvement stated in the previous paragraph, 
the Product Quality Law still contains serious flaws. For example, it does not 
define “producers” or “sellers.”122 Article 4 provides only that “[p]roducers 
and sellers are responsible for the product quality according to the provisions 
of the law.”123 In reality, a product may require several stages of production 
by several manufacturers.124 The Product Quality Law does not recognize the 
possibility of multiple producers expressly. Even if the law recognizes this 
possibility, the ambiguity is likely to confuse parties and courts.  
Article 43 provides a prime example of the procedural flaws in the 
Product Quality Law. It enumerates consumer compensation and the 
indemnity rights of breaching parties.125 Article 43 states that a victim may 
seek compensation from either the seller or producer, but it does not impose 
any duty on the plaintiff to identify or select the correct party.126 It is likely 
that certain opportunistic plaintiffs will file claims against the parties with the 
strongest financial status, regardless of their actual culpability. Even if the 
wrongly-accused party is shielded from liability, Article 43 does not prevent 
the opportunistic plaintiff from bringing these suits. This omission may result 
in unnecessary litigation and waste of judicial resources.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Compare Product Quality Law with Consumer Protection Law. 
 120. Product Quality Law art. 41. 
 121. Compare Civil Law and Consumer Protection Law with Product Quality Law. 
 122. See Product Quality Law art. 4. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Paragon, supra note 29, at 29. 
 125. Product Quality Law art. 43. Article 31 stipulates: 
If damages are done to the person or properties of others due to the defects of products, the victims 
may claim for compensation either from the producers or sellers. If the responsibility rests with the 
producers and the compensation is paid by the sellers, the sellers have the right to recover their 
losses from the producers. If the responsibility rests with the sellers and the compensation is paid 
by the producers, the producers have the right to recover their losses. 
Id. art. 31. 
 126. Id. 
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Article 43 also places the word “or” between “producers” and “sellers.”127 
Even in the absence of opportunistic plaintiffs, the “or” becomes a source of 
further confusion. The most likely interpretation is that the plaintiff can sue 
only one party. If either a seller or producer wins a judgment, the plaintiff 
might bring another suit against the party previously unnamed, thereby 
creating excessive litigation. The extra court costs and time likely will erase 
whatever benefit is derived from the implementation of the Product Quality 
Law. 
Article 43 also provides a right of contribution between sellers and 
producers.128 Because the Article does not explain why a liability-free party 
should compensate an injured party, the text seems to encourage the initial 
defendant to commit to a voluntary settlement:  
If the responsibility rests with the producers and the compensation is 
paid by the sellers, the sellers have the right to recover their losses 
from the producers. If the responsibility rests with the sellers and the 
compensation is paid by the producers, the producers have the right to 
recover their losses.129 
This process is not only confusing but also inherently unfair. For example, it 
is possible for an initial defendant seller to compensate a profiteering plaintiff 
as part of a judgment, but the seller is unable to recover the same amount 
from a liable producer who is financially unable to contribute. Sellers who 
lack liability then would bear the cost of the damages inflicted by producers. 
Adding explicit language to Article 43 allowing the plaintiff to join all 
possible tortfeasors in one suit would improve judicial efficiency.  
Many Chinese legal scholars and victims of defective products complain 
that the law does not compensate for pain and suffering resulting from 
defective products.130 Although Article 44 explicitly provides compensation 
for bodily injuries, it says nothing about emotional or mental injuries.131 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Paragon, supra note 29, at 29-31. 
 131. Article 44 stipulates: 
If bodily injury is caused by the defect of products, the party responsible shall pay for medical 
expenses and nursing expenses during medical treatment, the lost income due to absence from 
work; if the bodily injury has resulted in disability, the party responsible shall also be responsible 
for the expenses of self-supporting equipment including allowances, compensation of the disabled 
person and the living expenses necessary for those under the support of the disabled person; if 
death has resulted, the party responsible shall pay for funeral expenses, compensation and the 
living expenses necessary for those supported by the dead. 
Product Quality Law art. 44. 
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Furthermore, the second paragraph notes that if “the victims sustain other 
major losses, the party responsible shall compensate for the losses,” but it 
provides no definition of “major losses.”132 
In a recent interview with China Daily, Yang Shukun, secretary-general 
of the CCA, criticized the current Product Quality Law’s lack of a clear 
compensation provision: “[I]nadequate laws and regulations have stopped the 
[CCA] and courts from working out satisfactory settlements for consumers 
who demand compensation for mental suffering.”133 Yang pointed out that 
both the General Principles of Civil Law and the Consumer Protection Law 
“stipulate that consumers are entitled to compensation for psychological 
damages.”134 The Product Quality Law is silent on this issue. Moreover, no 
consumer protection law clarifies a basis for compensation.135 “Due to the 
loopholes, many of those held responsible for psychological damage done to 
consumers are let off easily, leaving consumers in humiliating mental 
suffering.”136 
For the most part, Chinese courts have not awarded damages for pain and 
suffering. For example, a Shanghai appellate court reduced an award of 
250,000 yuan (US$30,120) to only 10,000 yuan (US$1,200) for a woman 
who claimed mental suffering after physically being searched by staff 
members of a drugstore, who suspected her of shoplifting.137 Despite such 
setbacks, Chinese consumers continue to claim psychological damages. In 
Hunan Province, local consumer associations handled more than thirty-seven 
hundred complaints in 1999, of which more than 80% demanded 
compensation for psychological damage.138 
B. Enforcement 
Unlike the Consumer Protection Law, the Product Quality Law has an 
independent enforcement agency: the State Bureau of Quality and 
Technology Supervision.139 The government relies heavily on the Bureau. 
Article 7 of the Product Quality Law provides the relevant statutory support: 
“The product quality supervision and administrative departments of the State 
Council are responsible for the supervision and administration of the quality 
 132. Id. 
 133. Suffering Requires Protection, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 7, 1999. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Liang Chao, Quality Not Quantity Stressed, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 2, 2000. 
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of products of the whole country. All relevant departments of the State 
Council shall be responsible for the supervision of product quality within 
their own functions and duties.”140 The same Article also delegates 
responsibilities to local supervision departments.141  
China’s certification system is an example of the state’s exercise of the 
supervision and control duties. Article 14 of the Product Quality Law 
establishes China’s modern product certification system: “The State shall 
institute the system for certifying quality control system of enterprises 
according to the quality control standards commonly accepted 
internationally.”142 Previously, the Chinese government maintained direct 
supervision over the certification process. However, since 1994, the 
government no longer directly supervises quality certification.143 In its effort 
to match international standards, the Chinese government adopted a common 
international practice, entrusting “third party organs to carry out certification 
. . .”144 Currently, “14 independent quality system registration and auditing 
bodies have been accredited by the National Accreditation Committee for 
Quality System Registration Bodies.”145 However, the Product Quality Law 
does not provide for liability of certification bodies that fail to make proper 
certification. 
State agencies also conduct various publicity campaigns for quality 
control.146 The State Quality and Technical Supervision Administration has 
sponsored such campaigns for the past seven years.147 For example, the 
Administration has requested greater media participation in encouraging 
manufacturers and consumers alike to drive out all inferior products from the 
market.148 Pan Yue, Vice Director of the State Quality and Technical 
Supervision Administration, explained that “[m]edia reports have proved to 
be an effective way of supervising product quality and informing consumers 
of legal weapons to protect themselves against substandard products.”149 
These campaigns against fake and shoddy products have won visible 
support from top government officials. For example, China’s Vice Premier 
 140. Product Quality Law art. 7. 
 141. Article 7 states: “Local administrations . . . are responsible for the supervision of product 
quality within their own administrative jurisdictions. The relevant departments . . . at and above the 
county level are responsible for the product quality within their respective functions and duties.” Id. 
 142. Id. art. 14. 
 143. Ma Zhiping, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 16, 1994. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Media Good Aid to Ensure Quality Products, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 11, 1999. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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Wu Bangguo participated in a 1999 campaign.150 At the commencement of 
this campaign, Wu suggested that the upcoming campaign focus on “fake 
farm chemicals, composite fertilizers, seeds, construction materials, 
automobile parts, cigarettes, medicine, disposable injectors and 
cosmetics.”151 Groups of “reporters, business representatives and quality-
control experts” throughout the country supervised quality-control efforts at 
grassroots levels and raised public awareness of quality-control 
improvements and necessities.152 The results of the campaign were 
disheartening. “More than 250 million yuan (US$30 million) worth of 
products were discovered to be fake or of poor quality and 2,261 production 
facilities for these items were closed during the inspection.”153 
In Zhejiang province, the inspection team located a common source of 
local enforcement inadequacies.154 The team discovered that many local 
leaders feared an aggressive effort to root out fake and defective goods would 
jeopardize local economic growth, especially in the private economy.155 
Zhejiang Province’s private economy is one of the strongest in the country, 
but “its product quality is below the national average.”156 “Some even think it 
is inevitable for self-employed people and private enterprises to make fake 
and sub-standard goods during a certain period of their development,” said 
Chen Guangyi, head of the Zhejiang investigating team and chairman of the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the NPC.157 The province 
conducted a survey in 1998 and “found only 40 percent of the food products, 
58.9 percent of the electric appliances, 57.1 percent of the agricultural 
materials and 43.8 percent of the construction materials were up to the 
standard.”158  
This lack of enforcement is not unique to Zhejiang Province. In 
Chongqing, lack of local enforcement of quality control has had disastrous 
consequences. “Poor construction projects have a major hindrance in China’s 
economic development and at a cost of many innocent lives.”159 On January 
4, 1999, “at least 40 pedestrians died and 15 were hurt in the collapse of a 
 150. Meng Yan, Fake, Mediocre Goods Reported, CHINA DAILY, May 13, 1999. 
 151. Dian Tai, Campaign to Eradicate Fake Goods, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 27, 2000. 
 152. Liang Chao, supra note 139. 
 153. Meng Yan, supra note 150. 
 154. Xu Yang, Higher-quality Products Urged, Long Battle Looms Over Shoddy Goods, CHINA 
DAILY, July 6, 1999. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Poor Quality Costs Lives, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 22, 1999. 
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footbridge in Qijiang County.”160 After the bridge tragedy, an intense 
investigation of 305 construction projects in the Chongqing municipality 
revealed that forty-seven required immediate closure.161 “It has been found 
that many of the flimsy projects have been built without license or without 
following the bidding procedures required by the construction authorities.”162 
A criminal investigation was also conducted to determine the identity of 
responsible parties; it found that several local officials completely ignored 
quality control and supervision requirements.163 
Some of the most shocking defective products cases involve alcoholic 
beverages. Through July of 1999, beer bottle safety ranked as the number 
one consumer complaint in China, and “[b]ottle explosions in the April-June 
period claimed the lives of five and injured 52.”164 Moreover, these bottle 
defects “resulted in more than 154,000 yuan (US$18,600) of financial losses” 
for Chinese consumers.165  
During its investigation of consumer products, the State Bureau of 
Quality and Technical Supervision discovered more than 250 million yuan 
worth of products that were fake or of poor quality.166 These findings came a 
year after fake white liquor killed or injured more than 100 in Shanxi 
Province in 1998.167 The Bureau concluded that despite a strict market 
rectification following the Shanxi tragedy, fake liquor continues to be sold in 
rural areas.168 
These cases suggest that more meaningful control and supervision of 
products are necessary to combat persistent and widespread disregard for the 
Product Quality Law. Enforcement measures under the Product Quality Law 
need not be perfect to achieve effectiveness. However, China must improve 
enforcement in order to avoid similar tragedies in the future.  
V. RECENT ATTEMPTS AT IMPROVEMENT 
The Beijing Industrial and Commercial Bureau (BICB) is now 
concentrating on providing greater access to consumers so that they may 
protect their rights.169 The BICB has established websites and a hotline, 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Complaints by Consumers Rising, CHINA DAILY, July 14, 1999. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Meng Yan, supra note 150.  
 167.  Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Xiao Su, More Ways to Protect Rights, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 15, 1999. 
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providing convenient channels for consumers to air their grievances.170 These 
advances allow consumers to file complaints with the BICB from the 
comfort of their home.171 The hotline, staffed by officials from the BICB, 
provides consumers with “information and measures to be taken in order to 
better protect consumer rights.”172 Both channels highlight the increase 
support provided to consumers by the BICB to correct questionable business 
practices. 
The CCA also is trying to strengthen ties with consumer rights 
organizations in Hong Kong and Macao.173 These other consumer rights 
associations have helped the CCA identify vulnerable areas and plug 
loopholes created by the language of the Consumer Protection Law.174 The 
CCA has attempted to clarify the ambiguities that create those loopholes by 
requesting that the Supreme People’s Court issue an official interpretation.175 
The efforts by the CCA and BICB have proven to be a useful tool to restore 
consumer confidence in the Chinese marketplace. 
In addition to these efforts, the new Product Quality Law amendments 
enacted in recent months provide a more aggressive quality supervision 
system.176 The amendments set forth rules and penalties regarding spot check 
failures.177 In addition, state and local product quality, industry, and 
commerce departments and administrations were granted search, 
investigation, and seizure powers.178 The amendments also increased 
monetary damages for violators179 and adopted more stringent labeling and 
packaging requirements.180 Under the new amendments, certification bodies 
can be held liable for consumer losses caused by their failure to inspect.181 
Finally, the newly amended law includes new clauses on reporting 
offences.182 “The revised law further defines the government’s responsibility 
to improve product quality and stresses that enterprises must accept 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Teamwork Protects Consumers, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 30, 1999. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Lee, supra note 20, at 417. This interpretation is expected to be issued soon. Id. 
 176. Wu Yan, Legislature to Amend Product-Quality Law, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 27, 2000. The 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Concerning Amendment of the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Product Quality, was adopted on July 8, 2000. It was 
promulgated on the same date and came into force on September 1, 2000. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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supervision from quality control departments.”183 
Top-level government officials are acting to speed up product liability 
enforcement as well. According to Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo, local quality 
supervision bureaus, currently administered by local governments, will be 
placed under the administration of provincial-level quality supervision 
departments.184 “The reforms are expected to remarkably improve the 
management and training of quality supervision officials.”185 Wu also 
promises to close loopholes to corruption.186 These actions reflect a 
concerted government effort to increase consumer confidence and hold 
industry and government officials accountable for substandard products. 
The new additions to the Product Quality Law signal progress toward 
greater protection for Chinese consumers. However, the amendments still 
exclude pain and suffering damages and fail to establish a more concrete 
basis for compensation. As a result, the Chinese courts have filled in the 
gaps. Recently, the Supreme People’s Court of China ruled that victims of 
mental pain and suffering should be compensated.187 This ruling defined the 
range and application of such compensation liability, making it easier for 
aggrieved consumers to receive compensation for mental suffering.188 “The 
interpretative ruling did not put a ceiling on the financial compensation for 
mental suffering , but stressed that factors such as the results of the suffering, 
the economic capacity of the perpetrators and local living conditions should 
be taken into consideration when judges decide on the amount of 
compensation.”189 After issuing the interpretation, Tang Dehua, Vice 
President of the Supreme People’s Court, reminded the public that the 
purpose behind this type of compensation is “to console the victims, educate 
and punish the perpetrators and establish among the public the idea of 
respecting other people’s personal rights and dignity.”190 
 183. Id. 
 184. Quality to Be Put Under Independent Supervision, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 29, 1999. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Shao Zongwei, Personal Rights Protected, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 13, 2001. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. The personal rights that are protected by the new ruling include the right to life, to health, 
to name, to portrait, to reputation, to dignity and to freedom. 
 190. Id. 
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
While China has made great strides to improve its product liability laws, 
further improvements are needed. First, the legislature should amend the 
Consumer Protection Law to remove its confusing ambiguities. A new 
amendment should define terms such as “consumers” and “business 
operators.” If it is the intent of the NPC to cover “other injured parties” as 
rightful claimants, then the definition of “consumer” should include them.  
Second, the government should establish a more affirmative role for itself 
in the new amendments. Empty language such as “listen” and “take into 
account” should be replaced with provisions that entrust specific government 
agencies with clearly delineated powers.  
Third, with or without a new amendment, the CCA should take a more 
aggressive approach in protecting consumer rights by lobbying the 
appropriate government organs to enforce tougher penalties against violators. 
In addition to its current operations, the CCA should actively solicit official 
government support to strengthen the CCA’s ability to protect Chinese 
consumers. The Consumer Protection Law itself should remove roadblocks 
and greatly expand consumer associations’ role in protecting consumer 
rights. 
Fourth, the Chinese government must work to eliminate corruption at the 
local level. The CCA can help consumers negotiate better settlements with 
manufacturers or sellers; however, it cannot supervise production facilities or 
confiscate shoddy goods. Real and effective attacks against substandard 
products must come from official state agencies. To enforce the Product 
Quality Law, corruption among local officials must be checked.191 Top 
Chinese government organs already have recognized the effect of local 
corruption,192 and government sponsored campaigns have begun to target this 
area. Law enforcement agencies should increase efforts to crack down on 
repeated malpractice in the manufacturing and selling of counterfeit and 
inferior goods.  
Finally, the media should continue to act as a watchdog. Since the 
Toshiba case unfolded, Chinese media have played a positive role in 
protecting consumer rights. Only after exposure by media reports did 
government officials speak out against the Japanese producer.193 The Quality 
Inspection Bureau should continue its unofficial cooperation with Chinese 
media to strengthen the supervision and control of the quality of products as 
 191. Gao Jin’an, Legislators Draft Laws To Fight Corruption, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 31, 1994. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., Meng Yan, supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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intended by Article 1 of the Product Quality Law. The Chinese media not 
only should publicize cases of shoddy or defective products after the defects 
are discovered, but also should focus on educating the manufacturers and 
consumers to prevent such cases. These suggestions are by no means 
exhaustive. Nevertheless, they should prove useful in protecting China from 
defective or substandard products.  
The Great Wall of China is one of the great wonders of the world, built to 
protect the ancient Chinese dynasties from marauding tribes from the North. 
It was constructed by building and rebuilding a series of walls and 
fortifications over a span of several dynasties lasting more than 1,000 years. 
If constructed properly, Chinese product liability law can become another 
great wall, protecting consumers against invasions of their rights. The 
Consumer Protection Law and Product Quality Law have laid a foundation 
for the protection of those rights. However, China’s product liability law 
needs continuing reform. Changes might not come easily, but China has laid 
the foundation by recognizing the importance of these laws. China is now on 
course to achieve greater control over product quality and safety. 
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